Waging War on Pascal's Wager
The Wager runs along these lines:
1. Either God exists or He does not, and you can either believe in God or you can not.
2. If God exists and you believe in Him, the benefit to you is infinitely great (you will be rewarded such that there can be no improvement of your circumstances) and if God does not exist and you do not believe in Him, then you've only lost a finite sum.
3. If God exists and you do not believe in Him, you might suffer infinite or finite punishment (it doesn't really matter which) and if God does not exist and you do not believe in Him, you have lost nothing.
4. You should behave in a way which maximises your expected returns.
C. You should believe in God.
The argument -- when set out in greater detail -- is generally considered to be valid. Attacks are usually made upon it being sound (premises 2 and 3 are usually challenged).
Alan Hájek has an interesting take on it: he denies that the argument is valid. For those interested, it's quite a technical objection and I'm not entirely sure that Hájek succeeds in demonstrating that it's invalid (he certainly shows another reason why the argument has significant problems).
Personally, there seems to be something just fundamentally wonky about the whole Wager. Nobody -- with the possible exceptions of the symbol-processing machines over in
Reasoning about beliefs is usually done after the fact. I believe something is true: when that belief is challenged, I find reasons why my belief is accurate (including attempts to show that the belief is inaccurate). The reasons for this are obvious: we generally have too much going on in our lives to sit down and work out every belief we should hold. So we believe first and rationalise second. Pascal doesn't believe in God because it's the best bet; Pascal believes in God for numerous socio-cultural reasons. Similarly, nobody's going to change their (dis)belief in God because it's the best bet.


